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[Can] American justice, American liberty, American
civilization, American law, and American Christianity
.be made to include and protect alike and forever
all American citizens in the rights which have been
guaranteed to them by the organic and fundamental
laws of the land?'
Almost a century ago the distinguished abolitionist and
statesman Frederick Douglass,2 born a slave, pondered whether
blacks would be full and equal participants in the American
dream and asked the above question. Despite the millions of
words espoused by lawyers, by lawyer-politicians, and sometimes
even by law professors proclaiming the progress of American
law, among many there still persists the nagging doubt whether
legally sanctioned racism 3 of the past4 and its present impact will
* This essay started out as a traditional book review. As I read Professor Bell's
excellent treatise RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW (1973), I kept wondering why law
professors have not published similar casebooks before. Accordingly, this essay is de-
signed to serve the dual purpose of reviewing Bell's work and exploring the relevance of
racism and the American legal process as a discipline for study by lawyers and law
students. In these days of full disclosure, it should be indicated that I do not speak from a
.neutral stance," if such exists. For the last three years I have taught Racism and the
Early American Legal Process at the Graduate School of the University of Pennsylvania
and at the University of Pennsylvania Law School. I have developed this theme at greater
length in HIGGINBOTHAM & RIGNEY, RACE AND THE LEGAL PROCESS IN THE UNITED
STATES, ch. I-XIII (unpublished monograph), and in chapters in the following works: Is
Yesterday's Racism Relevant to Today's Corrections? in LAw ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE AD-
MINISTRATION, OUTSIDE LOOKING IN 1-21 (1970); Law Enforcement and Justice, in NATIONAL
SECURITY MANAGEMENT-NATIONAL URBAN PROBLEMS, ch. 8 (H. Yoshpe and F. Burdette
eds. 1970); The Black Prisoner: America's Caged Canary, in VIOLENCE, THE CRISIS OF
AMERICAN CONFIDENCE, ch. 7 (H. Graham ed. 1971).
t DistrictJudge, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania;
Adjunct Professor of Sociology, University of Pennsylvania Graduate School; Lecturer in
Law, University of Pennsylvania. B.A. 1949, Antioch College; LL.B. 1952, Yale Univer-
sity. i R. LOGAN, THE BETRAYAL OF THE NEGRO 9-10 (1965) (quoting Frederick Douglass).
According to Frederic Holland, Douglass' statement was, "The real question, the all-
commanding question, is whether American justice, American liberty, American civiliza-
tion, American law, and American Christianity can be made to include and protect alike
and forever all American citizens." F. HOLLAND, FREDERICK DOUGLASS 375 (1891).
2 For a superb collection of Douglass' papers, see F. DOUGLASS, LIFE AND TIMES OF
FREDERICK DOUGLASS (rev. ed. 1893); P. FONER, FREDERICK DOUGLASS (1964); P. FONER,
THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS (1950-55).
3 For a definition of racism, I accept the analysis of A. DowNs, RACISM IN AMERICA,




be eradicated 5 in this decade or even in this century. Did the
nation reach its highest plateau of racial options and understand-
ing in the late 1960's? Will future improvements be miniscule at
Perhaps the best definition ofracism is an operational one. This means it must be
based upon the way people actually behave, rather then upon logical consistency
or purely scientific ideas. Therefore racism may be viewed as any attitude, action
or institutional structure which subordinates a person or group because of his or
their color. Even though "race" and "color" refer to two different kinds of
human characteristics, in America it is the visibility of skin color-and of other
physical traits associated with particular color or groups-that marks individuals
as "targets" for subordination by members of the white majority.
See also G. FREDERICKSON, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND xi (1971):
[Racism is] synonymous with race prejudice and discrimination, but ... might be
considered preracist or protoracist, if one defines racism in a more restricted
way-as a rationalized pseudoscientific theory positing the innate and perma-
nent inferiority of nonwhites. Racism in this second sense had some roots in the
biological thinking of the eighteenth century but did not come to fruition or
exert great influence until well along in the nineteenth.
4 For an analysis of early practices, see Higginbotham, Racism and the Early American
Legal Process, 1619-1896, 407 ANNALS 1 (1973). Also see the pioneer work of Mary
Frances Berry, BLACK RESISTANCEJWHITE LAW (1971). For general background, see R.
BARDOLPH, THE CIVIL RIGHTS RECORD (1970); J. BLASSINGAME, BLACK NEW ORLEANS
(1973); J. BLASSINGAME, THE SLAVE COMMUNITY (1972); S. ELKINS, SLAVERY (1959); J.H.
FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM (3d ed. 1967); G. FREDRICKSON, THE BLACK IMAGE
IN THE WHITE MIND (1971); L. GREEN, THE NEGRO IN COLONIAL NEW ENGLAND (1942);
W. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK (1968); G. MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA (1944); B.
QUARLES, THE NEGRO IN THE MAKING OF AMERICA (rev. ed. 1969); K. STAiPP, THE
PECULIAR INSTITUTION (1956); C. WOODSON & C. WESLEY, THE NEGRO IN OUR HISTORY
(11 th ed. 1966); C.V. WOODWARD, ORIGINS OF THE NEW SOUTH (1951); C.V. WOODWARD,
THE SRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (2d rev. ed. 1966). For the best bibliography, see A.
HORNSBY, THE BLACK ALMANAC 169 (1972). For an anthology, see CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE
AMERICAN NEGRO (A. Blaustein & R. Zangrado eds. 1968).
'See Burns, Black People and the Tyranny of American Law, 407 ANNALS 156, 160
(1973):
The numerous successful legal attacks upon segregation have not solved the
problem of racism and the law for black people today. Racism is still part and
parcel of the daily reality of the functioning of the justice system. Blacks are still
subjected to the overtly racist attitudes, actions, and comments of an overwhelm-
ingly white justice system. Black people are likewise affronted by a legal system
that so often works against them and too seldom works for them.
In 1967, the United States Commission on Civil Rights concluded:
What is not visible to the eye and what apparently is not generally understood is
the feeling of many Negro ghetto residents that they live in a "trap" from which
they cannot escape. The life of the slum dweller-physically bare-is charac-
terized by frustration, despair and hopelessness. He has a sense of powerlessness
and a feeling of inability to communicate his own problems, control his own
destiny or influence persons in positions of authority.
It would be reassuring to conclude that the situation of Negroes in the
slums is not dissimilar to that of past generations of American immigrants who
lived in ghettos but were able to leave. Many white Americans have drawn this
conclusion and have expressed the belief that Negroes themselves are responsi-
ble for their condition and that all that is required to escape is personal effort.
But the analogy is misleading and dangerous. Negroes are not recent immig-
rants to our shores but Americans of Iong standing. They were oppressed not by
foreign governments but by a system of slavery supported by this government
and its people. The legacy of slavery continues in the form of racial segregation
(de facto is no longer legal), discrimination and prejudice. Escape from the ghetto
for any group is much more difficult in the America of the 1960's than it was
one or two generations ago. Society has become more complex, and unskilled
employment or small business enterprises no longer are meaningful first steps
up the ladder.
UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, A TIME TO LISTEN ... A TIME TO ACT
89-90 (1967).
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best, or will the progress of the 1960's suffer a steady erosion?
Professor Derrick Bell's monumental casebook, Race, Racism and
American Law, 6 provides keen insights into the legal past, its
impact on the present, and the legal options for diminution of
racism in the future.
Professor Bell's is the first major casebook 7 which, even as its
title makes clear, basically and almost exclusively focuses on
racism as a specific past and present pathology in the American
legal process. While racism could theoretically include discrimi-
nation against any person or racial group, white or black or any
hue in between, Professor Bell's book is primarily "concerned
with American racism initiated by whites against blacks, and
seeks to determine to what extent that racism is reflected in the
law."' However, his book is not limited solely to blacks. He has
one chapter concerning racism against other non-whites, with
particular commentary on the problems of Indians, Chinese,
Japanese, and Mexicans, and on racism in other countries.
Though some authors have dealt with racism (often tangentially)
under the umbrellas of constitutional law, civil liberties, or civil
rights, Bell's book is the first since the pioneer work of Professors
Thomas Emerson and David Haber9 which offers a truly com-
prehensive coverage of the matrices of racism and law.' 0
I. WHY SHOULD RACISM BE STUDIED IN LAW SCHOOL?
Many Americans still find it too traumatic to study the true
story of racism as it has existed in this country under the "rule of
law." For many, the primary conclusion of the National Commis-
sion on Civil Disorders is too painful to hear:
What white Americans have never *fully understood
---but what the Negro can never forget-is that white
society is deeply implicated in the ghetto. White institu-
tions created it, white institutions maintain it, and white
society condones it."
6 D. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW (1973) [hereinafter cited as BELL].
7 Of course, there are general historical works which covered this field in a non-
casebook fashion. See note 4 supra.
8 BELL, supra note 6, at xxxix.
9 POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES (T. Emerson & D. Haber eds.
1952). Norman Dorsen joined Emerson and Haber in editing later versions of the book.
POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES (student ed. T. Emerson, D. Haber &
N. Dorsen 1967) [hereinafter cited as POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS]. Professor Bell
acknowledges the debt we all owe Emerson, Haber and Dorsen. BELL, supra note 6, at xl.
10 H. HOROWITZ & K. KARST, LAW, LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE (1969), deals with
cases and materials on slavery, racial segregation and inequality of educational opportu-
nity. While a solid piece of scholarship, its weaknesses are that exclusive of the early
historical period, it is limited to the field of education, and it is not sufficiently current
because it was published five years ago. There are also other books specifically directed to
civil rights issues. See, e.g., THE BILL OF RIGHTS READER (4th ed. M. Konvitz 1968).
11 NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT 1 (1968).
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This conclusion of the Commission was more often than not
sidestepped by the early American constitutional law books. Yet
the failure of renowned legal scholars to probe these racial issues
adequately over the last several decades may be a partial cause of
our present inability or tardiness in correcting the sequelae to
yesterday's and even today's brutal racial injustices. Law cannot
be taught in a valueless vacuum. By the very process of selecting
which cases their students will read and discuss in class, profes-
sors help shape the horizons of future lawyers, judges, presi-
dents and other public officials. While many view law school
solely as a training ground for practicing lawyers, the conse-
quence of legal training is far greater. We should not be un-
mindful that, as Professors Eulau and Sprague have said, lawyers
have become the "high priests of politics.112 Of the fifty-two
signers of the Declaration of Independence, twenty-five were
lawyers, as were thirty-one of the fifty-six members of the Conti-
nental Congress. Of the thirty-seven American presidents,
twenty-four have been lawyers.' 3 Between 1877 and 1934, sev-
enty percent of American presidents, vice-presidents and cabinet
members were lawyers. 14 Some have thought that there is an
"overrepresentation of the legal profession compared with other
occupations."' 5 Governor Herbert Lehman once said that there
is a "conspiracy of lawyer legislators to perpetrate for their
profession the obstructions to justice by which it prospers."'
6
Woodrow Wilson once commented, "The profession I chose was
politics; the profession I entered was the law. I entered one
because I thought it would lead to the other."' 7 I have often
wondered about the significance of the fact that the three presi-
dents (Truman, Kennedy and Johnson) who in my lifetime have
12 H. EULAU & J. SPRAGUE, LAWYERS IN POLITICS 11-30 (1964).
13 Id. 11. See also D. MATTHEWS, THE SOCIAL BACKGROUND OF POLITICAL DECISION
MAKERS 30 (1954).
14 H. EuLAu & J. SPRAGUE, supra note 12, at 11.
Of a total of 995 elected governors in all American states between 1870 and
1950, 46 percent were practicing lawyers.
In the legislative branches, the ascendancy of the legal profession is equally
marked. Of 175 members serving in the Senate of the United States between
1947 and 1957, 54 per cent were lawyers. In the seventy-first through the
seventy-fifth Congresses, from 61 to 76 per cent of the members of the Senate
and from 56 to 65 per cent of the members of the House of Representatives
belonged to the legal profession.
A survey of all 7,475 American state legislators serving in 1949 showed that 22
per cent were lawyers. About 30 per cent of the members of the Wisconsin
legislature in 1957 were attorneys, as were 25 per cent of those serving in the
Indiana General Assembly in 1959. In the four legislatures of New Jersey, Ohio,
Tennessee, and California in 1957-where the data for the present study were
collected-52, 36. 30, and 30 per cent of the members, respectively, were
lawyers.
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provided the most significant leadership in giving blacks fuller
options were not lawyers.
No one has spoken over the years with greater clarity about
the transmission of basic goal values in law school than Professor
Myres S. McDougal.18 Only recently he reminded law schools:
[Transmitting goal values] is a step you cannot avoid
even if you wish to. The position that Professor Lasswell
and I took many years ago was that while all law is
policy, not all policy is law. All law, in the sense that it
affects a distribution of values among people in a com-
munity, is policy; some policy is, however, naked power.
Whether we like it or not, law schools, lawyers, government
officials, all of us, are working with values all the time. The
only question is how consciously, how deliberately, and
how systematically we formulate and clarify these
values. 19
Of course, I am not suggesting that constitutional law pro-
fessors should seek to galvanize students to any ideology. Rather,
the obligation is to present to students the fullest spectrum of
views. An analysis of past constitutional law casebooks is relevant
if it indicates that, from a racial perspective, the full spectrum of
issues has often not been presented. This exposure of views is
particularly essential in the field of constitutional law. For, as we
know, "[d]ue process is an elusive concept. Its exact boundaries
are undefinable, and its content varies according to specific
factual contexts. °2 0 Justice Cardozo has defined due process as
" 'principle[s] of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience
of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.'"21 If key race
relations opinions, majority or dissenting, are excluded from
casebooks, students may be denied an exposure to important
perspectives or values. When concepts or cases of critical histori-
cal significance are excluded from the casebook, the student is
left to drift on his own.
Recently, the University of Washington Law School adopted
an admission policy designed "to increase participation within
the legal profession by persons fiom racial and ethnic groups
[black Americans, Chicano Americans, American Indians, and
Philippine Americans] which have been historically denied access
Is Lasswell & McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in the
Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203 (1943); McDougal, The Law School of the Future: From Legal
Realism to Policy Science in the World Community, 56 YALE L.J. 1345-55 (1947).
Is McDougal, Beware the Squid Function, I LEARNING AND THE LAW 16, 17 (1974)
(emphasis added).
20 Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 422 (1960) (Warren, C.J.) (dictum).
21 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts,
291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
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to the profession and which consequently are grossly under-
represented within the legal system."22 To this latter policy,
Chief Justice Hale, of the Washington Supreme Court, vigor-
ously dissented and responded by saying "preferential" policy
"confesses to prior racial discrimination which I doubt existed."23
While certainly reasonable persons might disagree as to the
merits of such preferential policies, certainly no person, even
one with meager historical information, should doubt that there
has been prior racial discrimination.24 Yet some lawyers and
even judges, probably because of their isolation or their lack of
information, are oblivious to the historical effects of past racial
discrimination. Thus, one of the values of Professor Bell's book
is that it gives some, but probably not enough, of the history of
past racial deprivations so that today's problems can be under-
stood in an appropriate legal and historical context.
II. THE RELEVANCE OF Dred Scott v. Sandford25
Nowhere is the floundering or the reluctance of earlier
constitutional law scholars to deal with racism more evident than
in their almost total inattention to the Dred Scott case and other
cases pertaining to slavery and the early postbellum civil rights
decisions. I have often wondered why it was not until a decade
after my 1952 graduation from Yale Law School that I first read
any major portion of the Dred Scott case, and even worse, that I
had never been aware of the powerful dissents of Justices
McLean and Curtis.
In chapter one, Professor Bell uses Dred Scott v. Sandford as
his first major case. He has adroitly excerpted the 337 page
opinion to nineteen pages of text.
22 De Funis v. Odegaard, 507 P.2d 1169, 1175, cert. granted, 94 S. Ct. 538 (1973).
23Id. at 1189 (emphasis added). There is substantial debate whether
the University of Washington's policy was truly preferential, since the Law School
Admission Test and grade data may not be the most accurate measure of one's potential
either at law school or in the profession. See Brief for Harvard University as Amicus
Curiae; brief for National Conference of Black Lawyers; brief for National Council of
Jewish Women and other organizations as Amicus Curiae, De Funis v. Odegaard, 94 S.
Ct. 538, granting cert. to 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169 (1973). See also Morris, Equal
Protection, Affirmative Action and Racial Preferences in Law Admissions: De Funis v. Odegaard,
49 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1973); Comer & Coleman, Quotas, Race and Justice, N.Y. Times, Mar.
17, 1974, § 4, at 15, col. 5.2
4 For works concerning the past history of racial discrimination see note 4, supra.
With regard to the legal profession, see Gellhorn, The Law Schools and the Negro, 1968
DUKE L.J. 1069; Leonard, 407 ANNALS 134 (1973); Shuman, Black Lawyers Study, 16
HOWARD L.J. 225 (1971); Tollett, Black Lawyers, Their Education and the Black Community,
17 HOWARD L.J. 326 (1972).
25 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). For a detailed analysis of Dred Scott, see Higgin-
botham and Rigney, supra asterisk note, ch. XII. See also V. HOPINS, THE DRED SCOTT
CASE (1951); L. MILLER, THE PETITIONERS: THE STORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES AND THE NEGRO 62-81 (1966); 3 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN
UNITED STATES HISTORY 1 (1922).
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It was in Dred Scott that Chief Justice Taney, for the Court,
held that under the Constitution a black man
had no rights which the white man was bound to respect; ...
the [N]egro might justly and lawfully be reduced to
slavery for his benefit. He was bought and sold, and
treated as an ordinary article of merchandise and
traffic, whenever profit could be made by it. This opinion
was at that time fixed and universal in the civilized portion of
the white race.1
6
Thus, with a sweep of his pen, the Chief Justice destroyed all
hopes that blacks, whether "free" or slave, had of gaining access
to. the federal courts or the federal government for even the
slightest protection of some human rights. The doors to the
federal courts, the executive27 and the Congress 28 were slammed
shut.
A. The Universal View?
Chief Justice Taney's opinion knowingly contained numer-
ous historical inaccuracies which were willfully slanted against
blacks. For example, the belief at the time of the constitutional
convention that "a black man had no rights which the white man
was bound to respect" was hardly "universal." As early as Feb-
ruary 18, 1688, the Mennonites in Germantown, Pennsylvania,
had passed a highly popularized and vigorous resolution against
the institution of slavery.2 9 In 1772, before our revolution, Lord
Mansfield stated from the Kings Bench:
The state of slavery is of such a nature, that it is
incapable of being introduced on any reasons, moral or
political; but only positive law, which preserves its force
long after the reasons, occasion, and time itself from
whence it was created, is erased from memory: It's so
odious, that nothing can be suffered to support it, but
posive law. Whatever inconveniences, therefore, may
follow from decision, I cannot say this case is allowed or
approved by the law of England; and therefore the
black must be discharged. 30
26 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 407 (emphasis added).
27 For a discussion of the limitations which the President and others had placed on
giving blacks full options, see N. WEYL & W. MARINA, AMERICAN STATESMEN ON SLAVERY
AND THE NEGRO (1971). For an interesting analysis of a later era, see G. SINKLER, THE
RACIAL ATTITUDES OF AMERICAN PRESIDENTS, FROM ABRAHAM LINCOLN TO THEODORE
ROOSEVELT (1972).
28 On February 11, 1837, the House of Representatives resolved, by a vote of 162-18,
that "slaves do not possess the right of petition secured to the people of the United States
by the Constitution." W. GOODELL, THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
37 (rev. ed. 1968).2 9 See H.S. COMMAGER, DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 37-38 (8th ed. 1968); M.S.
LOCKE, ANTI-SLAvERY IN AMERICA, 1619-1808 (Johnson Reprint 1969).
31 Somerset v. Stewart, 98 Eng. Rep. 499, 510 (K.B. 1772). For an excellent analysis
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When reflecting on this country's tolerance of slavery,
Thomas Jefferson observed, "Indeed I tremble for my country
when I reflect that God is just; that his justice cannot sleep
forever."31 In fact, slavery had been effectively abolished prior to
our constitutional convention by the Massachusetts Supreme
Court in the Quock Walker Cases,32 and legislative action had
been taken in other states.
33
As Professor Louis Pollak has noted, Thomas Jefferson had
written a clause in his July 2, 1776 draft of the Declaration of
Independence, later to be withdrawn at the insistence of dele-
gates from Georgia and South Carolina, "reprobating the enslav-
ing of the inhabitants of Africa. ' 34 Thus, part of the tragedy of
Dred Scott is that the court reached a constitutional holding
mutilating the options of blacks while relying partially on inaccu-
rate historical data known by the Court to be false.
B. The Racist Significance of Dred Scott v. Sandford
The Dred Scott holding was unquestionably racist.35 Chief
Justice Taney's opinion constitutionally doomed only blacks to
the status of mere property, whether they were born in this
country or not, whether they were "free" or slave. The forceful
dissents by Justices McLean and Curtis36 emphasized that "[a]
slave is not a mere chattel. He bears the impress of his Maker,
and is amenable to the laws of God and man; and he is destined
to an endless existence. '37 However, the dissenters could not
of the Somerset case and Lord Mansfield, see J. Tombs, Lord Mansfield, 1973 (unpub-
lished monograph, University of Pennsylvania Department of Sociology).
31 T. JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 156 (1954). Jefferson further
observed that the parents' involvement in slavery makes an impact on the white child,
developing "the worst of passions, and thus nursed, educated, and daily exercised in
tyranny, [the child] cannot but be stamped by it with odious peculiarities. The man must
be a prodigy who can retain his manners and morals undepraved by such circumstances."
Id. 155. When empathizing with the slave, Jefferson said:
For if a slave can have a country in this world, it must be any other in preference
to that in which he is born to live and labor for another; in which he must lock
up the faculties of his nature, contribute as far as depends on his individual
endeavors to the evanishment of the human race, or entail his own miserable
condition on the endless generations proceeding from him.
Id. 3
2 The Quock Walker cases are a series of related cases centering upon the beating of a
slave, Quock Walker, by his master, Jennison, in the early 1780's. The cases are described
in Higginbotham & Rigney, supra asterisk note, ch. V (citing Quock Walker v. Jennison,
13 PROCEEDINGS OF THE MASSACHUSETrs HISTORICAL SociETY, 1873-75, at 296 (Ist Series,
1875); Jennison v. Caldwell, id.; Commonwealth v. Jennison, id. 293). The same cases are
cited in 4 H. CATrERALL, JUDICIAL CASES CONCERNING AMERICAN SLAVERY AND THE
NEGRO 479-80 (reprint 1968). See also L GREENE, THE NEGRO IN COLONIAL NEW ENGLAND
(1942); D. ROBINSON, SLAVERY AND THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN PoLiTIcs 24-29 (1971).
-"See D. ROBINSON, supra note 32, at 29.
34 THE CONSTITUTION AND THE SUPREME COURT 9 (L. Pollak ed. 1966) (quoting 1 T.
JEFFERSON, WRITINGS 28 (P. Ford ed. 1892)).
2 See note 3 supra.
36 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 529 (McLean, J., dissenting), 564 (Curtis, J., dissenting).
"7Id. at 550 (McLean, J., dissenting).
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sway a majority of the Court. Others have suggested that Taney's
decision was nothing more than a political maneuver to aid
President Buchanan.38 Abraham Lincoln said that the opinion
made it seem that "all the powers of the earth" were combining
against the Negro, and "now they have him, as it were, bolted in
with a lock of a hundred keys, which can never be unlocked
without the concurrence of a hundred men, and they scattered
to a hundred different and distant places."39
The thirteenth amendment eradicated both slavery and the
badges and incidents of slavery. Under its enabling clause, it
gave Congress the "power to pass all laws necessary and proper
for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery in the United
States. '40 As Senator Trumble of Illinois, the chief spokesman
for the thirteenth amendment, has stated, its purpose was to
"destroy all these discriminations in civil rights against the black
man; and if we cannot, our constitutional amendment amounts
to nothing."'4I Accordingly, to appreciate the full impact of the
thirteenth (as well as the fourteenth and fifteenth) amendment,
one must at least begin with Dred Scott to meaningfully under-
stand the deprivations which the amendment was designed to
eradicate.
Professor Bell's first chapter, with its inclusion and analysis
of Dred Scott and other slavery cases, has provided the critical
starting focus to comprehend the interrelationship between ra-
cism and the early American legal process.
III. A SURVEY OF CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW BOOKS
In recent years I have talked to hundreds of law school
professors and have found that even today very few have any
real knowledge of the racist reasoning, historical inaccuracies,
rationale or consequences of the Dred Scott decision. My es-
teemed and liberal constitutional law professor at Yale, John
Frank, had only a one-sentence reference to Dred Scott in his
casebook. In his comments on the Taney era Professor Frank
noted, "We need not pause long with the judicial work of the
Taney court.... Foremost of the Supreme Court decisions at the
time was in the case of Dred Scott, . . . which, for all its
fascination, no longer has immediate relevance for our times.
'42
3 8 L. MILLER, supra note 25, at 80-81; 3 C. WARREN, supra note 25, at 16-41.
39 L. MILLER, supra note 25, at 79.
40 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883).
41 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 322 (1866) (emphasis added). See also the
thorough history given by Mr. Justice Stewart for the Court in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co., 392 U.S. 409, 438-44 (1968).
42J. FRANK, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 120 (1950) (emphasis
added). To some extent I had reservations about mentioning Professor Frank by name. I
would not want this reference to be considered a disparagement-he was one of the most
sensitive professors I met on the issue of race relations. He was the leader among
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Similarly, the four43 volume work by Professors Emerson, Haber
and Dorsen, Political and Civil Rights in the United States,4 4 has
been by far the most encyclopedic and scholarly treatise in its
field. Yet in their classic, they do not cite the Dred Scott case even
once. 45 Nor do they include any substantial analysis of slavery
law and its interrelationship to present constitutional problems.
After reviewing my law school constitutional law book and
class notes, I thought that if a liberal professor such as John
Frank believed Dred Scott "no longer ha[d] immediate relevance
for our times," then certainly other renowned professors had
offered generations of law students a similarly myopic view. My
complaint is not unique; Professors Horowitz and Karst com-
mented in 1969 that they "both regret having completed law
school without having studied the Dred Scott case, surely one of
the most important judicial decisions an American court ever
made.''46 After checking with Professor Louis Pollak of Yale Law
School on the major constitutional law casebooks published from
1895 through 1973, I surveyed twenty-two of the basic ones,47
starting with Professor James B. Thayer's 1895 volume-the first
significant casebook in the constitutional law field-and conclud-
ing with Professor Bernard Schwartz's 1973 casebook.
American law professors in filing the significant amicus curiae brief in Sweatt v. Painter,
339 U.S. 629 (1950), and his work on the fourteenth amendment is still a classic. See
Frank & Munro, The Original Understanding of "Equal Protection of the Laws," 50 COLUM.
L. REV. 131 (1950). One of the most popular casebooks used today, W. LOCKHART, Y.
KAMISAR & J. CHOPER, THE AMERICA%' CONSTITUTION (1970), similarly does not discuss
the bearing of Dred Scott on race relations at all.
43 See note 9, supra.
44 POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 9.
45This conclusion is based upon an examination of the table of cases.
41 H. HoaowITz & K. KARST, supra note 10, at 2.
47 Whenever it was available, I surveyed the first edition of these casebooks. The
chart of my findings is on file at the University of Pennsylvania Law School. I am most
grateful for the laborious research perfbrmed by Kenneth Henderson, a third year law
student, who checked each of these volumes. "Ae used the table of cases as our guide.
Conceivably, the author may have neglected to put the cases in his table of cases, and we
did not think it would warrant our thumbing through each page to catch that possible
error. In chronological order, the casebooks surveyed were: J. THAYER, CASES ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1895); J. SMITH, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1896); C. BOYD,
CASES ON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1898); E. McCLAIN, A SELECTION OF CASES ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1900); H. BARNES & B. MILNER, SELECTED CASES IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3d ed. 1912); J. HALL, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1913); E.
WAMBAUGH, A SELECTION OF CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1914-15); D. MCGOVNEY,
CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1930); W. DODD, CASES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1937); N. DOWLING, CASES ON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW (1937); H. ROTTSCHAEFER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1948); J.
FRANK, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw (1950); J. SHOLLEY, CASES ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1951); P. FREUND, A. SUTHERLAND, M. HowE & E. BROWN,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1954); A. MASON & W. BEANEY, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(3d printing 1954); T. POWELL, VAGARIES AND VARIETIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION (1956); R. McKAY, AN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW READER (1958);
E. BARRETr, P. BRUTON & J. HONNOLD, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1959); P. KAUPER,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1954); W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR, J. CHOPER, THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION (1964); R.E. CUSHMAN & R.F. CUSHMAN, CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(1965); B. SCHWARTZ, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1972).
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While there could be an endless debate over which cases
before the Supreme Court from 1842 to 1896 were the most
critical, I thought that for today's perspective there were at least
four cases48 which were extremely important in indicating the
spectrum of diverse judicial views in race relations cases. They
are Prigg v. Pennsylvania49 and Dred Scott v. Sandford50 from the
slavery era, and the Civil Rights Cases5 l and Plessy v. Ferguson
52
from the early post-Reconstruction era. The casebooks were
surveyed to ascertain whether these key race relations cases had
been included as principal or major excerpted cases. My concern
was whether the reader of the casebook would have been put on
notice of the significance of these cases. I did not grant "credit"
where there was merely a citation of the case with nothing more
than a one or two sentence explanation, because such a brief
reference is not adequate to reflect either the diversity of judicial
views in the case or to provide any real insight into the case's
importance for race relations. Furthermore, if an author used
only a one sentence reference to a major race relations case, by
implication he was saying that it was not as significant for
constitutional law purposes as the other principally excerpted
decisions included in the casebook. Furthermore, I felt that the
exclusion of opinions suth as Justice Harlan's dissents in the Civil
Rights Cases and Plessy v. Ferguson was significant because it
precluded the student from reading nonracist responses to what
today must be admitted were the racist holdings5 3 of the major-
48 In addition to the four cases listed in the text, the following cases were surveyed:
Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908); Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1
(1906); James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127 (1903); Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678 (1887);
United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542
(1876); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876); Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 36 (1873); United States v. Powell, 151 F. 648 (C.C.N.D. Ala. 1907), affd per
curiam, 212 U.S. 564 (1909). We did not find any distribution of use significantly different
than Plessy and the Civil Rights Cases for these cases.
4941 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
50 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
51 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
-2 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
5' Loren Miller concluded that the Plessy majority "reduced the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to little more than a pious goodwill resolution" and that it "had smuggled Social
Darwinism into the Constitution and had armed future generations of segregationists
with the cherished doctrine that they could protect racial discrimination through law while
preserving it against change with the fiction that law could not function in that sphere of
human affairs!" L. MILLER, supra note 25, at 169, 170. Miller further analyzed Plessy by
stating that "'[a]lthough the South had lost the war it had conquered constitutional law.'
... mhe Supreme Court had revived some of the dogmas of the Dred Scott case." Id
178 (quoting R. HaRIS, THE QUESr FOR EQUALITY 108 (1960)). The effects of Plessy
were legion:
The Negro, under the Court's guardianship, was reduced to a despairing
second-class citizen: voteless in the South; helpless in the face of constant and
brutal aggression; indicted by all-white grand juries and convicted by all-white
trial juries; denied access to places of public accommodation; represented in
public office by those whose very elections were dependent upon their promise
to white voters to double and redouble his [the black's] disabilities; forced to
scrounge and cage for an education; segregated in every phase of his life;
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ity. For in his powerful dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, Justice
Harlan said:
[I]n view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law,
there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling
class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our Constitu-
tion is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates
classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all
citizens are equal before the law. The humblest is the
peer of the most powerful. The law regards man as
man, and takes no account of his surroundings or of his
color when his civil rights as guaranteed by the supreme
law of the land are involved. It is, therefore, to be
regretted that this high tribunal, the final expositor of
the fundamental law of the land, has reached the con-
clusion that it is competent for a State to regulate the
enjoyment by citizens of their civil rights solely upon
the basis of race.
In my opinion, the judgment this day rendered
will, in time, prove to be quite as pernicious as the
decision made by this tribunal in the Dred Scott case.
54
Finally, he concluded, "The destinies of the two races, in this
country, are indissolubly linked together, and the interests of
both require that the common government of all shall not permit
the seeds of race hate to be planted under the sanction of law." 55
Amazingly, Thayer dealt in great detail with Dred Scott in his
first book, including one of the concurring opinions56 and the
dissents of Justices McLean and Curtis. However, only four of
the twenty-two casebooks published after Thayer's included Dred
Scott as a principal case. From 1928 to 1950 none of the authors
excerpted or cited it as a principal case; from 1928 to 1972 only
one author (John B. Sholley in 1951) included it in any major
respect. Thayer stood alone in his inclusion of Prigg.57
condemned to separate and unequal schools and public facilities of every kind;
and with no place to turn for redress of his grievances except to the Courts that
had approved the devices used to reduce him to his helpless and almost hopeless
degradation.
Id. 180. Cf. A. PIFER, THE HIGHER EDUCATION OF BLAcKs IN THE UNITED STATES 49
(1973) (emphasis added):
My second impression is that of the substantial role played by the courts in the
integration of higher education. It is true, of course, that it was the judiciary which in
Plessy v. Ferguson created the great detour of "separate but equal" which threw America
off coursefor so many long years. Nonetheless, in the past four decades the judiciary
has more than redeemed itself.
54 163 U.S. at 559.
55 Id. at 560.
56 Professor Thayer did not include Chief Justice Taney's opinion, but induded
Justice Nelson's concurrence because "[i]t was originally prepared, by direction of the
majority, to stand as the opinion of the court." J. THAYER, supra note 47, at 480 n.1.
57Prigg is important because it arose in an earlier era-1842. In Prigg, the Court,
through Justice Story, liberally construed the powers of Congress to extensively legislate
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Not one constitutional law professor included Justice
Harlan's Civil Rights Cases dissent until John P. Frank did so in
1950. Even more tragically, it was not until publication of John
B. Sholley's casebook in 1951 that any professor included
Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson.
IV. THE DEMISE OF THE THIRTEENTH, FOURTEENTH
AND FIFTEENTH AMENDMENTS, 1896-1946
Tragically, it was apparent by the 1880's that the "original
understanding""8 of the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth
amendments was being steadily emasculated by a hostile Su-
preme Court.
5 9
The last iung of hope for blacks dropped out in 1896 with
the federal birth of the separate but [un]equal doctrine. In Plessy
v. Ferguson,60 the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional right
of a state to enact a statute providing for separate railway
carriages for the white and colored races. The Court impliedly
for the capture of fugitive slaves, even though there was no enabling dause in article IV,
§ 2. Conversely, the Supreme Court later construed the thirteenth and fourteenth
amendments as narrowly as possible, strictly limiting the powers of Congress despite the
presence of enabling dauses in the two amendments. Justice Harlan put Prigg in this
perspective through his dissents in the Civil Rights Cases and Plessy v. Ferguson. In the
Civil Rights Cases, while speaking of Prigg, he noted:
We have seen that the power of Congress, by legislation, to enforce the
master's right to have his slave delivered up on claim was implied from the
recognition of that right in the national Constitution. But the power conferred
by the Thirteenth Amendment does not rest upon implication or inference....
That doctrine ought not now to be abandoned when the inquiry is not as to an
implied power to protect the master's rights, but what may Congress, under
powers expressly granted, do for the protection of freedom and the rights
necessarily inhering in a state of freedom.
109 U.S. at 33-34.
58 See Pennsylvania v. Local 542, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 347 F. Supp. 268,
291-93 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (Higginbotham, J.); H. FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1908); Frank & Munro, The Original Understanding of "Equal
Protection of the Laws;" 50 COLUM. L. REv. 131 (1950); Frantz, Congressional Power to Enforce
the Fourteenth Amendment Against Private -Acts, 73 YALE L.J. 1353 (1964). See also 2 W.
CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION 1083-1118 (1953); R. HARRIS, THE QUEST
FOR EQUALITY (1960); J. JAMES, THE FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1965); B.
KENDRICK, THE JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON RECONSTRUCTION
(1914); J. TENBROEK, THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
(1951); Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L REV. 1
(1955); Boudin, Truth and Fiction about the Fourteenth Amendment, 16 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 19
(1938); Crosskey, Charles Fairman, "Legislative History," and the Constitutional Limitations on
State Authority, 22 U. CMI. L. REv. 1 (1954); Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment
Incorporate the Bill of Rights? 2 STAN. L. REv. 5 (1949); Fairman, A Reply to Professor
Crosskey, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 144 (1954); Frank & Munro, The Original Understanding of
"Equal Protection of the Laws," 1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 421; Graham, The "Conspiracy Theory" of
the Fourteenth Amendment (pts. 1-2), 47 YALE L.J. 371 (1938), 48 YALE L.J. 171 (1938);
Graham, The Early Antislavery Backgrounds of the Fourteenth Amendment (pts. 1-2), 1950 Wis.
L. REv. 479, 610.
9 See BELL, supra note 6, at 195-208; L. MILLER, supra note 25; Bell, Black Faith in a
Racist Land, 20 J. PUB. L. 409 (1971); Franklin, History of Racial Segregation in the United
States, 304 ANNALS 1 (1956).
60 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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approved the right of a state to establish separate schools and
other public facilities for blacks and whites, saying:
[W]e think the enforced separation of the races . . .
neither abridges the privileges or immunities of the
colored man, deprives him of his property without due
process of law, nor denies him the equal protection of
the laws, within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment .... 61
Think of the type of nation we would now have if in 1896
our leaders had really followed the message of Justice Harlan
that "the common government of all shall not permit the seeds
of race hate to be planted under the sanction of law.
62
If this message had been implemented, subtle or blatant
racism would not be one of the underlying issues in the current
political campaigns. There would be no problems of busing
today; nor would there be the extensive racial ghettos that now
exist in the inner cities of our nation. The striking racial gaps
between black and white economic, health and educational at-
tainment would be either nonexistent or significantly diminished.
But we have these tragic disparities today because moral
leadership and the legal process did not support the concept of
an open society. Blacks were abandoned by the 1877 Hayes-
Tilden Compromise 63 -and the 1896 Plessy v. Ferguson capitula-
tion. For decades no substantial moral leadership was provided
in this field by the White House, by the courts, by the schools, by
the Congresses, or by the state governments, and often not even
by the churches.
The catastrophic backlash in education that resulted from
the Plessy v. Ferguson doctrine seems almost unbelievable." As an
example, in Berea College v. Kentucky, 65 the Supreme Court in
1908 upheld the validity of a 1904 Kentucky statute which
prohibited a college from teaching white and Negro pupils in the
same institution. Berea College was established in the Kentucky
mountains in 1854 by a small band of Christians who began their
charter with the words, "God hath made of one blood all nations
that dwell upon the face of the earth. ' 66 After the Civil War it
admitted students without racial discrimination, and by 1904 it
had 174 Negro and 753 white students. It was a private institu-
61 163 U.S. at 548.
6 2 1d. at 560.63 See R. LOGAN, supra note 1, at 15-47 (1965); A. PIFER, supra note 53, at 11; C.V.
WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (2d rev. ed. 1966).64 See L. MILLER, supra note 25, at 165-82; A. PIFER, supra note 53, at 13-23.
65 211 U.S. 45 (1908).
11 L. MILLER, upra note 25, at 197.
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tion supported by those who subscribed to its religious tenets,
and it neither sought nor received any state aid or assistance. Yet
the Supreme Court held that a state could prohibit any private
institution from promoting the cause of Christ through inte-
grated education. What a tragic ruling! A nation loudly pro-
nounces its faith in freedom of religion, yet sanctions a state's
denial of the day to day application of religious concepts if
practiced in an integrated religious setting. Justice Harlan wrote
another eloquent dissent in Berea College, and, tragically, Justice
Holmes, the darling of the legal liberals, concurred in the
majority's repressive opinion.
Professor Bell, in commenting on this period, has said:
And as the gains made by blacks-political, legal,
and social-were erased in the 1870's, the Supreme
Court and the lower courts confirmed in their decisions
what blacks had feared, that the citizenship they had
been granted, which indeed they believed they had
earned through the blood of thousands of blacks who
had died fighting on the Union side during the War,
was citizenship in name only ...
In the process, blacks were damaged. But with faith
and grace that some of us still sing about, that Amazing
Grace, we survived.
67
During this era of 1896 to 1946, the Constitution was not
viable in striking down the reign of racism. The legislative,
executive and judicial branches seemed almost totally impotent
in effecting meaningful change. From the presidency of
Grover Cleveland through that of Herbert Hoover, presidents
were either patently hostile or generally unsympathetic to the
muted and cautious requests by blacks for some slight improve-
ment of their lot. During this era, blacks were restricted to the
most menial jobs. With only the rarest of exceptions the profes-
sional, managerial, secretarial, and "white collar" jobs were cer-
tainly unreachable for even the most talented and competent
blacks. Even the false rumor that a black had been present at an
official White House function was sufficient to drive President
Cleveland to frenzy, and thus he responded: "It so happens that
I have never in my official position, either when sleeping or
waking, alive or dead, on my head or my heels, dined, lunched,
supped, or invited to a wedding reception, any colored man,
woman, or child.
6 8
6'7 Bell, supra note 59, at 414.
68 G. SINKLER, supra note 27, at 270.
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When a most moderate colored leader, Booker T. Washing-
ton, informally had lunch with President Theodore Roosevelt:
The Memphis Scimitar said, "The most damnable outrage
which has ever been perpetrated by any citizen of the
United States was committed yesterday by the Presi-
dent, when he invited a nigger to dine with him at the
White House." Senator Benjamin Tillman of South
Carolina said, "Now that Roosevelt has eaten with that
nigger Washington, we shall have to kill a thousand
niggers to get them back to their places." Georgia's
governor was sure that "no Southerner can respect any
white man who would eat with a Negro."
The ultimate obscenity was sponsored by Governor
James K. Vardaman of Mississippi, in his newspaper: "It
is said that men follow the bent of their geniuses, and
that prenatal influences are often potent in shaping
thoughts and ideas in after life. Probably old lady
Roosevelt, during the period of gestation, was fright-
ened by a dog, and that fact may account for the
qualities of the male pup that are so prominent in
Teddy. I would not do either an injustice, but am
disposed to apologize to the dog for mentioning it."
There was more much more, in the same scurrilous vein
by newspapers, officeholders and southern politicians.
69
With such responses to even an informal luncheon with
Booker T. Washington, it appeared that most occupants of the
White House did not accept the philosophy of John F. Kennedy
that "There is more to the Presidency than just letting things
drift .... "70
Apparently, Woodrow Wilson had no qualms about the
plight of blacks. A black newspaper, The New York Age, warned
that Wilson, "both by inheritance and absorption ... has most of
the prejudices of the narrowest type of southern white people
against the Negro." Princeton University, of which Woodrow
Wilson was President from 1900 to 1910, was the only major
northern school that excluded Negro students. Moreover, as
governor of New Jersey from 1911 to 1912, his "progressivism"
did not embrace the Negro. Wilson's "New Freedom" had been
"'all for the white man and little for the Negro.' Wilson had not
" Pennsylvania v. Local 542, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 347 F. Supp. 268,279
& n.15 (quoting L. MILLER, supra note 25, at 206-07).
"0Edelman, Southern School Desegregation, 1954-1973, 407 ANNALS 32, 35 & n.12
(quoting R. SARRATr, THE ORDEAL OF DESEGREGATION 52 (1966)).
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visited 'any colored school, church, or gathering of colored
people of any nature whatever.'71
During Wilson's administration, there was a steady "expan-
sion of segregation in the federal department buildings in
Washington, a policy which Taft had begun."
72
The Congress was no better. It "had done nothing to protect
civil rights during Republican administrations and did nothing
under Wilson.173 "Neither Harding nor Coolidge had restored
Negro patronage to pre-Wilson levels, and in 1928 Hoover
bypassed the regular black-and-tan organizations to cultivate
white support in the South."74 Government offices and cafeterias
remained segregated; the War Department segregated Negro
Gold Star mothers who were traveling to their sons' graves in
France; Hoover ignored race problems in his messages to Con-
gress. He made " 'fewer first class appointments of Negroes to
office than any President since Andrew Johnson.' "75
On December 5, 1946, by executive order, President Tru-
man appointed the first President's Committee on Civil Rights. 76
Its purpose was to prepare a report "with respect to the adoption
or establishment, by legislation or otherwise, of more adequate
and effective means and procedures for the protection of the
civil rights of the people of the United States. '7 7 It is indicative
of the racism and violence against blacks that existed in this
country during the 1920's and 1930's that the Committee spent a
portion of its report "call[ing] attention to the very substantial
and steady decline in the number of lynchings which have
occurred in the last two decades." 78 It went on to observe:
From a high point of 64 lynchings in 1921, the figure
fell during the 1920's to a low of 10 in 1928. During the
decade of the 1930's the total climbed again to a high of
28 in 1933, although the decade ended with a low of 3
in 1939. Since 1940, the annual figure has never ex-
ceeded 6; on the other hand, there has not yet been a
year in which America has been completely free of the
crime of lynching. The Committee believes that the
striking improvement in the record is a thing to be
devoutly thankful for; but it also believes that a single
lynching is one too many!
79
71 R. LOGAN, supra note 1, at 361 (quoting A. WALTERS, My LIFE AND WORK 257
(1917)).72 Id. 361.73 1d. 363.
7
4 G. TINDALL, THE EMERGENCE OF THE NEW SOUTH 1913-1945, at 542 (1967).
75Ma. (quoting Du Bois, Hoover, 29 THE CRISIS 362 (1932)).T6 Exec. Order No. 9808, 3 C.F.R. 590 (1943-1948 Comp.).77 1d.




Americans have been taught that equality comes through
the route of education. The disparity of income as late as the
1940's between blacks and whites who had the same academic
credentials is startling, however.
Nor can the disparity be blamed entirely on differ-
ences in education and training. The 1940 census re-
veals that the median annual income of Negro high
school graduates was only $775 as compared with
$1,454 for the white high school graduate; that the
median Negro college graduate received $1,074 while
his white counterpart was earning $2,046; that while
23.3 percent of white high school graduates had wage
or salary incomes over $2,000, but four percent of
Negro graduates achieved that level.80
Since proportionately far fewer blacks finished high schools
or college because of the pervasive discriminatory patterns in
American life, these disparities (approximately fifty percent less
income for the same educational attainment) do not indicate the
actual magnitude of racial deprivation in this era. Even more
devastating than the income disparity was the demoralizing and
demotivating impact this discrimination had on young blacks.
Seeing these inequities, many felt that it was futile to try for
academic excellence, since brain power and tenacity would not
produce their just rewards."'
During this period the American Bar Association, while
righteous about the attempted "packing"8 2 of the Supreme Court
in 1937, did not have enough institutional morality to publicly
oppose discrimination by the state bar associations which de-
prived blacks of membership. In fact, the record indicates that it
was not until the mid-1940's that even one black (of course, a
super-black) was admitted to the American Bar Association.
8 3
sold. 58.
:t See generally G. MYRDAL, supra note 4.
8 For a collection of articles, see generally 23 A.B.A.J. 233-490 (1937). See id. 268,
354-57 (editorials). In the editorials, it is noted that "[t]he part which the American Bar
Association has played in the democratic defense of 'the Gibraltar of American liberties'
has given an added prestige and significance to actions taken by the Association . .. ."Id.
356. Yet as one of the guardians of the Gibraltar of American liberties, the A.B.A. did
not have the strength or the moral fortitude to take an institutional position against
racism within its own organization.
8 Similar discrimination against Negro lawyers by the American Bar Association
has led to the formation of the colored National Bar Association. In 1943 the
American Bar Association elected a Negro, Justice James S. Watson of New
York, the first to be admitted since 1912 when three Negroes, who were not
known to be Negroes, were accepted. The same year the Federal Bar Association
of New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut opened its membership to Negro
attorneys and condemned the 'undemocratic attitude and policy' of the Ameri-
can Bar Association for discriminating against Negro members. In the actual
practice of law so great are the limitations in the South that the majority of
Negro lawyers have settled in the North.
M. DAvIE, NEGROES IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 118 (1949).
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After analyzing the plight of black lawyers within his own profes-
sion, Judge Raymond Pace Alexander spoke in 194184 in behalf
of the necessity of a black bar association-the National Bar
Association-as follows:
Just so long as we are compelled to recognize racial
attitudes in America, and the positive refusal to admit
the Negro lawyer to membership in the Bar Associa-
tions of the South or even to permit them to use the
libraries, just so long as the Negro lawyer is restricted in
his membership in local Bar Associations in the North,
and particularly, so long as the American Bar Associa-
tion for all practical purposes refuses to admit Negroes
to membership, then so long must there be an organiza-
tion such as the National Bar Association. Certainly all
of us shall welcome the day when racial animosities and
class lines shall be so obliterated that separate Bar
Associations, other separate professional associations as
well as separate schools will be anachronisms.
8 5
This era of 1896 to 1946 was perhaps described most
accurately by Tuskegee Institute's president, Robert R. Moton, in
1929, when he stated "From the beginning ... the attempt has
been made to fix permanently the status of the Negro and so
remove the subject from public discussion and agitation .... But
it refused to stay fixed.18 6 President Hoover's Committee on
Social Trends reported in 1930 "'[t]he relationship of white[s]
and Negroes will raise continuing problems.' "8s7
In response to these continuing problems and the pressure
brought to bear by A. Phillip Randolph and others through the
March on Washington movement, President Roosevelt issued
Executive Order 8802 in June, 1941.88 The order provided that
"there shall be no discrimination in the employment of workers
in defense industries or government because of race, creed, color
or national origin.. . ."89 This weak executive order rested solely
on conciliation, without real enforcement power to assure mean-
w 4 When Judge Alexander wrote in 1941, of course he was not a judge, for there
were no judges of record in any base line court in Pennsylvania and probably not even
five such black judges in the nation. For a description of Judge Alexander's experiences
at the Bar, see Alexander, Blacks and the Law, 43 N.Y.S.BJ. 15 (1971), reprinted in 43 PA.
B. Ass'N Q. 61 (1971).
85 Alexander, The National Bar Association-Its Aims and Purposes, 1 NAT'L B.J. 2 (1941).
See also Reflections, 1 BALSA REPORTS 8 (1973) (reprint of excerpts from Judge
Alexander's speech).
86 G. TINDALL, supra note 74, at 540 (quoting R. MOTON, WHAT THE NEGRO THINKS
48-49 (1929)).
87Id. (quoting 1 PRESIDENT'S RESEARCH COMMITrEE ON SOCIAL TRENDS, RECENT
SOCIAL TnEDS IN THE UNITED STATES xli (1933)).
88 3 C.F.R. 957 (1938-1943 Comp.). For a history of this executive order, see P.
FONER, ORGANIZED LABOR AND THE BLACK WORKER, 1619-1973, ch. 17 (1974); R.
WEAVER, NEGRO LABOR, A NATIONAL PROBLEM (1946).
89Exec. Order No. 8802, 3 C.F.R. 957 (1938-1943 Comp.).
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ingful changes when hostile discriminatory patterns were
encountered. 90 Yet in response to Executive Order 8802 and a
suggestion by Dr. Studebaker of the Office of Education in 1944
that the colleges and universities of the South should open their
doors for the matriculation of Negro students, Senator Theo-
dore Bilbo, a lawyer, gave his "full and complete endorsement"
to the Jackson (Mississippi) Daily News' editorial comment that
the Washington officials should "go straight to hell." He em-
phasized that:
[The editor] is right when he says that the South won't
do it and, that not in this generation and never in the
future while Anglo-Saxon blood flows in our veins will
the people of the South open the doors of their colleges
and universities for Negro students. I repeat that [the
editor] is right. We will tell our Negro-loving Yankee
friends to go straight to hell. 9'
He concluded by stressing that:
History clearly shows that the white race is the custodian
of the gospel of Jesus Christ- and that the white man is
entrusted with the spreading of that gospel.
We people of the South must draw the color line
tighter and tighter, and any white man or woman who
dares to cross that color line should be promptly and
forever ostracized. No compromise on this great ques-
tion should be tolerated, no matter who the guilty
parties are, whether in the church, in public office, or in
the private walks of life. Ostracize them if they cross the
color line and treat them as a Negro or as his equal
should be treated ...
[I]t is imperative that we face squarely and frankly
the conditions which confront us. We must not sit idly
by, but we must ever be on guard to protect the south-
ern ideals, customs, and traditions that we love and
50See M. Ross, ALL MANNER OF MEN 21 (1948):
The Southern branch of the President's official family resented his FEPC [Fair
Employment Practice Committee]. Most of the policy makers in the big war
agencies were either apathetic or considered FEPC a necessary nuisance. Some
favored it for political reasons, some out of conviction. Nearly everyone hoped
that its activities could be kept harmlessly discreet. Because white people do not
generally try to follow what is in the minds of Negroes, official Washington fell
far short of realizing the urgencies behind Negro support of FEPC.
While of course the wartime executive order and Fair Employment Practice Commission
had some success stories, Ross's analysis of a case involving the Western Cartridge
Company illustrates the agency's impotence when encountering strenuous opposition. Id.
49-66.
0' The Development of Segregationist Thought 139 (. Newby ed. 1968) (quoting 90 CONG.
REc. A1799 (1944)).
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believe in so firmly and completely. There are some
issues that we may differ upon, but on racial integrity,
white supremacy, and love for the Southland we will
stand together until we pass on to another world.
9 2
Thus, during World War II, while thousands of black sol-
diers were dying on battlefields throughout the world to seek
victory for democracy against Hitler's Aryanism, the mold of
racism was still firm at home, to such an extent that neither civil
rights legislation nor anti-lynching laws could be enacted.
Other critics of racial equality spoke in voices less shrill than
Bilbo's, but their hatred and racism was just as intense. Instead
of interlinking, as did Bilbo, the gospel of Jesus Christ with white
supremacy, his successors -used more sophisticated terms such as
"interposition," and "nullification" and demonstrated a willing-
ness to sit in school house doors forever to assure segregation
forever.9 3
I quote Senator Bilbo with a full appreciation that there
were others who vehemently disagreed with his racist views. The
significance of Bilbo's comments is that they exemplify the
separatist rationale which was sanctioned under Plessy v.
Ferguson-thus a rationale which Justice Harlan had opposed in
his dissent. Yet, tragically, the casebooks read by generations of
law students did not present the other view, as embodied in
Justice Harlan's forceful dissents. Again, the exclusion of such
powerful dissents from casebooks indicates what may have been
the withholding of significant ideas from generations of lawyers
who would later become business leaders, union lawyers, presi-
dents, senators, congressmen, and public officials throughout the
land. Perhaps if the analysis which Professor Bell so wisely
included had been part of the constitutional law teaching from
1896 to the 1940's, at least some lawyers would have been more
leery of the racist views they proposed.
Of course, since 1944 there have been many extraordinary
advances to eradicate some of the injustices sanctioned by the
earlier legal process. The battleground in the courts has shifted
from a defense or sanction of blatant racism to defining whether
there are constitutionally permissible methods of eradicating the
consequences of past racism.94 Many institutions which discrimi-
92 Id. 143-145 (quoting 90 CONG. REc. A1801 (1944)).
'3 See generally POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 9, at
1264-68 nn.1-5.
There is a longstanding debate as to when the judicial freeze of black rights started
to thaw. Some might claim it was early as Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337
(1938), but that opinion must be construed as at least an implied reaffirmation of the
"separate but equal" doctrine. Others might suggest that from an impact standpoint, the
thaw started in Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946), where the Court held that
under the commerce clause states had no power to impose segregation affecting inter-
state passengers. But I place the first beacon of hope, though even then a dim one, with
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nated blatantly in the past, such as the American Bar
Association, a" have now taken positions against racism. But still,
as the Civil Rights Commission has observed, "The final chapter
in the struggle for equality has yet to be written. 9a These
advances have come about by reason of the tenacious efforts of a
relatively few lawyers (black and white) and an increasingly
enlightened court, but the burdens and obstacles have been
extraordinary. Yet it is undebatable that the progress would have
been far greater if lawyers, with their extraordinary overrep-
resentation in policy-making positions, had as a group been
more committed to equal justice for all.
V. CONTENTS OF BELL'S BOOK
In addition to Part I, The Development of Racism and
American Law, which is basically a historical analysis during the
time of slavery, Professor Bell covers five major areas which he
categorizes as the rights of citizenship, the right to education, the
right to housing, the right to employment, and the right to
justice. Each one is subdivided by chapters which cover current
racial civil rights litigation. As to rights of citizenship, he has
specific chapters on the right to vote, the right of access to public
facilities, the right to interracial sex and marriage, the right to
protest, and the right to military service and conscientious objec-
tor status. Bell thoroughly covers the problems of discrimination
in education, both southern and northern. Under rights to
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944), because the Court there overruled the wretched
doctrine of Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935). Some of the basic cases in the
post-1944 era are:
(1) Voting. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (implementation of
1965 voting rights act); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S.
368 (1963) (one man-one vote); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
(2) Education. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1
(1971); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State
Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
(3) Housing. Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431 (1973); Jones
v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
(4) Emplo)wnent. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Steele v. Louisville &
N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
(5) Public accommodations. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of
Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
(6) Prohibition of racial violence. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971); United
States v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 563 (1968); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
(7) In addition to the role exerted by the Supreme Court, the passage of the Civil
Rights Acts of 1957, 1964, 1965, and 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1974, 1975, 1993, 1995,
2000, 3601-19, 3631 (1970) was of profound significance.
05 Harrison Tweed, Bernard Segal and Whitney North Seymour have been particu-
larly effective voices for a more liberal attitude within the organized bar and the A.B.A.
For a perspective on the organized bar at its best, although involving a relatively few
lawyers, see LAWYERS COMM. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER THE LAW, TEN YEAR REPORT
(1973).
96 UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGH ES, FREEDOM TO THE FREE, CENTURY OF
EMANCIPATION, 1863-1963, at 207 (1963).
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housing, he has separate chapters on housing remedies for
individual blacks and housing remedies for blacks as a class. With
regard to the right of employment, he has separate chapters on
federal labor law and racial discrimination, and employment
discrimination and black self-help efforts; for the right to justice
he has chapters on remedies for summary punishment, and jury
discrimination.
Most of the major civil rights casebooks have been designed
as first generation Brown v. Board of Education97 casebooks. That
is, in their first editions the authors focused primarily on the
appellate litigation of the decade before the 1954 Brown decision
and on the litigation up to 1964. Thus, as an example, in the
voting rights area most authors have been inclined to use as
principal cases the primary election cases9" or poll tax cases99
which preceded the adoption of the twenty-fourth amendment
or the 1965 Civil Rights Act.100 When those textbooks were
written, these cases were essential for critical understanding of
the state of the law at the time. Today, however, effective
advocacy requires a mastery of the cases following the 1964 and
1968 Civil Rights Acts and the post-twenty-fourth amendment
cases. As a second generation book, Professor Bell's spends only
a few pages on the white primary and poll tax cases; most of the
principal cases used by him have been decided within the last ten
years.
Thus the chapters on voting are clearly adequate for either
the practitioner or the law school professor who seeks insights on
the current status of racial voting rights precedents and laws. But
if one wanted a fuller historical analysis with a collection .of
earlier cases in the voting rights field, Professor Bell's book
would not be sufficient; by reason of its one volume size, it does
not have a sufficient panoply of those historical cases.
By his selection of cases concerning the right to education,
Professor Bell demonstrates that his book is clearly a second
generation Brown v. Board of Education textbook. He has focused
most directly on some of today's most pressing and intricate
problems, such as post-Brown northern school litigation and de
facto versus de jure segregation, and he has included a thought-
ful, balanced chapter on alternatives to integrated schools.
For law school professors, Bell has included seventeen ra-
cism hypotheticals in his text. These give students and professor
a format for arguing a relevant problem; the class could be
divided into law firms and each firm assigned to represent a
particular party, and some students could act as judges.
97 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
98 Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
99E.g., Breedlove v. Shuttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937). See also Harman v. Forssenius,
380 U.S. 528 (1965) (post-twenty-fourth amendment).
100 4 2 U.S.C. § 1971 (1970).
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While I have spoken of Professor Bell's book primarily from
a professorial standpoint, it is also a handy and invaluable
reference book for the practicing lawyer in any civil rights
litigation (whether he or she is taking a "pro" or an "anti"
position). With this book in one's bag when entering court, an
advocate has a guidepost to the criss-crossing currents in civil
rights decisions.
While Professor Bell is entitled to high accolades for having
written this superb book, his greatest challenge lies in the future.
To keep it viable, he will have the awesome task of no less than
biennially preparing detailed supplements. Since his book went
to the printer, for example, the United States Supreme Court
decided Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 101 "the first
school desegregation case to reach [the] Court which involves a
major city outside the South,"'0 2 and divided four to four in
Bradley v. City of Richmond. 1 3 Bradley was the first major case
raising the issue whether a district court may compel the joinder
of a unitary school system with two other unitary school districts
in order to achieve a greater degree of integration and racial
balance.
Even now before the United States Supreme Court there are
at least two significant cases' 0 4 which may indicate whether the
thrust of the Warren Court has reached a plateau or whether the
Supreme Court recognizes that much still has to be done. The
challenge of this decade is whether the Constitution, which has
been flexible enough in the past to accommodate the aspirations
of labor,' 05  the aged,10 6 investors,' 0 7  minors, 10 8 farmers,10 9
consumers,"a0 and women,"' can have that same inherent vital-
ity for blacks, the weak and the poor."
12
101413 U.S. 189 (1973).
1
02 Id. at 217 (Powell, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
103 412 U.S. 92 (1973), affg by an equally divided Court 462 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1972)
(Justice Powell abstaining).
104 DeFunis v. Odegaard, 94 S. Ct. 538, granting cert. to 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d
1169 (1973); Milliken v. Bradley, 94 S. Ct. 538, granting cert. to 484 F.2d 215 (6th Cir.
1973).
105 NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S.- 175 (1967); United States v. Darby,
312 U.S. 100 (1941); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
100 Social Security Board v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358 (1946); Steward Machine Co. v.
Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
107 Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377
U.S. 426 (1964); American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 "U.S. 90 (1946); North
American Co. v. SEC, 327 U.S. 686 (1946).
101 Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
109 Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942);
Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38 (1939).
110 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191 (1972);
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
"I1 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908); Weeks
v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
112 For varying conceptions of poverty, compare Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indepen-
dent School District, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) with Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 530
(1972); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970);
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VI. THE FUTURE?
Viewing integration in college classes' 13 or on professional
football teams, there is an easy tendency to overestimate the
magnitude of accomplishments achieved by blacks and other
racial minorities during the last decade. However, the Sammy
Davis, Jr., Wilt Chamberlain, and Justice Thurgood Marshall
success stories must be placed within the broader context of the
United States Commission on Civil Rights' 1973 analysis of the
total spectrum:
Unemployment for blacks, Spanish surnamed
Americans, and other minorities remains far higher
than that of white America. For the past 15 years, the
unemployment rate for nonwhites has been twice that
for whites. The national rate in 1971 was 5.4 percent
for white Americans but 9.9 percent for blacks and
other minority individuals ...
The underemployment rates for minority Ameri-
cans are not just a consequence of past discrimination.
A look at youth employment rates refutes this argu-
ment. For white male adults, the unemployment rate is
4.0 percent; for white teenagers, it is 15.1 percent.
However, the statistics for minority male adults show a
rate of 7.2 percent; and for minority teenagers, a stag-
gering 31.7 percent.
In whole industries, such as building construction,
higher education, and government civil service, racial
and ethnic minorities and women are consistently ab-
sent or found in disproportionate numbers in low wage,
low status jobs ...
In 1971 the median family income for whites was
$10,672, compared with $6,440 for non-whites and
$7,117 (1970 figure) for Spanish surnamed Americans.
The discriminatory effect on minorities is obvious when
one considers that 32 percent of blacks were below the
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); King v. Smith, 392 U.S.'309 (1968); Gideon
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
113 By 1970 [blacks constituted] nearly 7 percent of full-time undergraduates,
but this still fell considerably short of the 11 percent which blacks represent in
the general population and the slightly higher percentage they constitute of the
college age population. When the 1972 Office of Civil Rights data is released,
however, we will find that the current figure is higher than 7 percent.
When one looks at the rate, in 1970, of participation of blacks at each level
of the four-year undergraduate course, a disturbing pattern emerges. In the
freshman year, blacks represented 8.3 percent of total enrollment; in the
sophomore year, 6.8 percent; in the junior year, 5.4 percent; and in the senior
year, less than 5 percent. This, of course, is partially attributable to an expand-
ing annual entry of blacks into higher education and in part reflects the number
of blacks now going to two-year community and junior colleges. However, it also
reflects a high attrition rate.
A. PIFER, supra note 53, at 29-30.
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low income level (poverty line) in 1971. Including
Spanish surnamed Americans, Indians, and other
minority groups, the figure declines slightly to 31 per-
cent. But the number of white Americans living in
poverty is only 8 percent. The receipt of public assis-
tance is another indicator of the economic status of
minority citizens. While 4 percent of the white popula-
tion receives public assistance, 25 percent of the minor-
ity population receives aid. In toto, 6.4 million minority
group persons rely upon public assistance in order to
survive.
1 14
The above data are more than merely interesting statistics.
They symbolize the tragedy that fills millions of human lives.
While the legal process cannot by its momentum alone correct all
of the historical deprivations, certainly no diminution of these
disparities will be possible without the interplay of a creative
legal process. If we create and maintain a national commitment
and concern, I am confident that during the next two or three
decades many of the vestiges and consequences of racism can be
eradicated in America. Blacks arrived in this country in 1619,115
a year prior to the Pilgrims' arrival on the Mayflower. Maybe
today's progress glows less brightly when put into a historical
context of centuries of delay.
When there has been a national commitment in other as-
pects of American life, the nation has been able to land men on
the moon, explore phenomena at the bottom of the ocean, and
even build awesome and destructive military weapons. Whether
we will be equally successful in the human goal of substantially
eradicating racism at home is similarly contingent upon a sus-
tained commitment to action rather than a mere retreat to
rhetoric. For these tasks, lawyers and legal scholars cannot es-
cape accountability for their action or inaction in this arena.
As much as any treatise, Professor Bell's book can play a
significant role in helping the nation to answer affirmatively
Frederick Douglass' inquiry so that American justice, American
liberty and American civilization will be made to "include and
protect alike and forever all American citizens in the rights
which have been guaranteed to them by the organic and funda-
mental laws of the land."
'' 6
14 UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, STATEMENT ON AFFIRMATIVE
AcTioN FOR EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES 2-3 (1973).
1ts "The twenty Negroes that were left at Jamestown in 1619 by the captain of a
Dutch frigate were the beginning of the involuntary importation of human beings into
the mainland that was not to stop until. more then two hundred years later.' J.H.
FRNKLIN, supra note 4, at 71. See aLso C. WOODSON & C. WESLEY, supra note 4, at 82.
116 R. LOGAN, supra note 1, at 9-10.
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